Principle 01
White Horse Is Not Horse 白马非马
"Horse" names a shape; "white" names a color; the compound "white horse" names a colored shape, and what you may seek when you ask for a horse (any color) you may not seek when you ask for a white horse. The mechanism is the separation of intension from extension: adding a modifier narrows the extension and enriches the intension, so the compound term is not interchangeable with its parts. A white horse is a horse (class membership), but "white horse" is not "horse" (class identity) — most of the ancient outrage at the paradox was a failure to distinguish the "is" of predication from the "is" of identity.
Principle 02
Separation of Hardness and Whiteness 离坚白
Consider a hard white stone: hardness is given by touch, whiteness by sight, and the two senses do not overlap — 「视不得其所坚」(sight does not grasp its hardness), 「拊不得其所白」(touch does not grasp its whiteness). Gongsun Long concludes that the qualities are separable (离坚白): nothing in perception presents hardness-and-whiteness as one, so each universal is an independent entity grasped by its own faculty. The mechanism is analysis by mode of access: qualities known through different channels are, epistemically, different objects — an early statement of the problem of universals.
Principle 03
Names Refer to Actualities 名实论
「夫名,实谓也」— a name is that by which we refer to an actuality. A name is correct when it picks out exactly the actuality it is assigned to, and incorrect when it wanders from its referent; error enters language not through false sentences but through misapplied names. The mechanism is a correspondence theory of reference: fix the actuality first, then let the name track it, and treat every dispute as first a question of which actuality each party's words are tracking — arguing about reference before arguing about the thing.
Principle 04
Each Name to Its Own 唯乎其彼此
「彼彼当乎彼,则唯乎彼」— let "that" apply only where that actuality obtains, and "this" only where this one does. A name that applies to both this and that indifferently is a name that refers to nothing; precision requires that each term be pinned to its own object and kept there. The mechanism is the discipline of stable reference: before reasoning, audit that every term in the argument denotes one actuality throughout, for the hidden source of most fallacies is a name that has quietly shifted its referent mid-inference.